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Daniel Webster, one of New Hampshire’s most
famous citizens, once declared, “There is noth-
ing so powerful as truth.” For over 50 years, the
Manchester Union Leader, the Granite State’s
most widely circulated newspaper, has includ-
ed this famous quote on its masthead and its
editorial page. However, the truth can also be
frustratingly complex, as the New Hampshire
Commission on Education Funding found as
it analyzed alternative solutions to New Hamp-
shire’s education funding problem. The Com-
mission, created by Governor Jeanne Shaheen
in April 2000, issued its final report in January
2001. §The Commission’s origins can be traced
back to a 1997 New Hampshire Supreme Court
ruling that the state could no longer rely on lo-
cal property taxes to pay for its public schools.
The Granite State was not the first to see its sys-
tem of financing education struck down by ju-
dicial decree. Over the past 35 years, court de-
cisions have induced at least 19 states, including
every state in New England except Maine and
Rhode Island, to diminish the role of the local
property tax in school funding. § For New
Hampshire, however, radical reform of school
finance is an especially unsettling prospect.
Many of New Hampshire’s citizens take great
pride in their state’s limited, decentralized gov-
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ernment. Until the Court decision (Claremont v. the State of
New Hampshire), no other state had delegated such a large frac-
tion of its fiscal responsibilities to cities and towns. New Hamp-
shire is the only state, other than Alaska, that levies neither a
broad-based personal income tax nor a retail sales tax. (And,
unlike Alaska, New Hampshire has no oil upon which to levy
severance taxes.) Instead, New Hampshire has relied heavily
on the local property tax. Many New Hampshire residents and
some economists believe that this strategy has been an impor-
tant competitive advantage for the state, enabling it to grow
faster than any of its New England neighbors for the past sev-
eral decades. Certainly, the absence of a sales tax has con-
tributed to the growth of malls and many other retail establish-
ments near New Hampshire’s border with Massachusetts.
According to the state Supreme Court’s decision (common-
ly referred to as “Claremont II”), the constitutional flaw in New
Hampshire’s local property tax is rooted in the wide variation
in per pupil property wealth across municipalities. Fiscally
comfortable towns, such as Bedford, were able to raise ample
money for education and other municipal functions with a
property tax rate of $17 per $1,000 of property value, while the
property-poor town of Berlin imposed a levy more than twice
as high. These large differences violate the requirement of the
state’s constitution that taxes be “reasonable and proportional.”
The Court further ruled that, given the difficulty of raising suf-
ficient property tax revenues in fiscally stressed towns, reliance
on the tax also violated the constitutional duty of the state to
provide every school-age child with an adequate education.
The Court told the legislature to determine what constitutes
an adequate education, how much achieving educational ade-
quacy would cost, and how the funds should be raised — oth-
er than through the local property tax.
So, with the bang of a gavel, New Hampshire was confront-
ed with possibly the most challenging fiscal issue in its histo-
ry. Short of a constitutional amendment directing the state’s
Supreme Court to “butt out” of the educational funding arena,
which was contemplated, significantly higher state taxes
seemed inevitable.
In 1999, the state met the Court’s mandate with what was
then viewed as temporary patchwork consisting of a state prop-
erty tax, increases in business profits taxes and excise taxes, and
tobacco settlement money. The legislature passed an income
tax, but Governor Jeanne Shaheen vetoed it. By the beginning
of 2000, forecasters were projecting budget deficits in fiscal bi-
ennium 2001-2002, and credit rating agencies were warning the
state to resolve the issue or see its bonds downgraded. In re-
sponse to the pressure to craft a long-term solution, the Com-
mission went to work. 
Governor Shaheen instructed the Commission to conduct a
comprehensive, objective evaluation of revenue options de-
signed to raise $825 million, the amount that the legislature had
determined was needed to provide an adequate education for
every New Hampshire student in the year 2000. She told the
Commission’s members that economic competitiveness should
be their primary concern: In devising new ways to fund schools,
the state must “enable New Hampshire to compete in the new
and increasingly global economy.” In addition, the Governor
directed the Commission to evaluate the impact
of each funding option on “particular sectors…,
property values, and taxpayers” and to consider
whether the option could “provide stable, suffi-
cient, and administratively efficient sources of
revenue for the foreseeable future.” She in-
structed the Commission not to make recom-
mendations, but simply to evaluate the pros and
cons of various alternatives.
The Commission looked at a variety of policy options: tax-
es on personal income, property, retail sales, value added, gross
receipts, capital gains, and purchases of tobacco products and
motor fuels. It also considered arrangements in which the state
would legalize video lottery terminals and share in a portion of
the revenues that their operation would generate. In the end,
the Commission focused much of its analysis on three candi-
dates: the property tax, a general sales tax, and the personal in-
come tax. 
In evaluating the various alternatives, the Commission used
seven criteria:
competitiveness. New taxes should not diminish New
Hampshire’s attractiveness as a place in which to live, work,
shop, and invest.
fairness. The burdens imposed by new taxes should be
distributed equitably.
adequacy and stability. New taxes should generate
enough revenue to finance adequate schooling, year in and
year out.
exportability.New taxes whose burdens are borne more
by nonresidents are preferable.
neutrality. New taxes should distort economic choices
as little as possible.
simplicity.A new tax should be simple to administer and
impose low compliance costs.
The Commission produced a wealth of analysis, much of
which is presented in its report. One conclusion that emerges
from this analysis is that there are few simple answers. The most
careful and dispassionate empirical studies often produce in-
conclusive or even contradictory results. Often, the data need-
ed to resolve a particular issue are missing. To some degree,
the Commissioners functioned like detectives, relying on a
combination of theory, evidence, and common sense to form
their judgments.
As the overview to the Commission’s report points out, the
“Commission found no single tax to be superior — or inferior
— on all counts.” For example, a sales tax would be more re-
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gressive than some of the other alternatives considered; but a
larger share of the burden would be borne by non-New Hamp-
shire residents than under other options. While the Commis-
sion considered all seven criteria in its evaluations, perhaps the
most salient — and controversial — findings related to com-
petitiveness and fairness. 
COMPETITIVENESS:
WHAT IS THE IMPACT ON JOBS?
In addressing the issue of competitiveness, the Commission es-
timated the impact on job creation of a state income tax, a state
property tax, and a retail sales tax. In each case, it was assumed
that the tax would raise $825 million per year, all earmarked for
education. The Commission concluded that each tax option
would depress New Hampshire’s total employment by between
3,000 and 7,000 jobs (0.5 and 1.1 percent, respectively) in the
year 2000 relative to the pre-Claremont-decision tax system.
The Commission found no consistent evidence that one tax
would have a more depressing effect than another.
In arriving at these estimates, the Commission confronted
several related questions. First, would the imposition of a new
state tax earmarked for education cause school districts to re-
duce local property taxes by an equal amount? Or would lo-
calities cut back only part way, resulting in an overall increase
in total state and local taxes and public spending? Based on
studies of the experience in other states, the Commission as-
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sumed that cuts in local property taxes would offset 50 percent
of the increase in state taxes, so that total state and local taxes
would increase by 50 percent. Second, would the effects of in-
creased state and local taxes be offset by the beneficial effects
of increased spending on education? Although employers are
attracted to areas with well-educated workforces, a review of
the evidence led the Commission to conclude that education-
al outcomes would not improve sufficiently to compensate em-
ployers for higher taxes.
To estimate the effect of the three tax options on employment,
the Commission used two approaches. In the “direct” ap-
proach, the Commission consulted the economics literature on
the effects of changes in state and local tax burdens (measured
as taxes per capita or taxes relative to income) on employment
levels. From this review of previous studies, estimates were
made of the likely employment impact of higher tax burdens
in New Hampshire.
In the “indirect” approach, the Commission considered who
would bear the burden of each tax. This is one of the thorniest
issues in the study of taxation. The imposition of a tax may
cause the individuals or businesses paying the tax to alter be-
havior. This change in behavior may shift the tax burden to oth-
er individuals and businesses, causing them, in turn, to alter
theirbehavior and shifting the tax burden yet again. Questions
of tax incidence permeate all discussions of tax competitiveness. 
Because New Hampshire employers compete intensely for
workers with firms in neighboring states, the Commission con-
cluded that the imposition of a personal income tax would force
firms to pay higher compensation. Some previous research also
indicated that an increase in the sales tax would also be reflected
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then computed the effect of these higher labor
costs on employment using the relationships es-
timated in previous studies. In the case of the
property tax, empirical evidence argues against
a shifting of the tax burden to employers in the
form of higher labor costs. Yet, many studies
have found that the impact of the property tax
on employment is similar to, or even greater
than, that of other state and local taxes.
FAIRNESS: WHO BEARS THE BURDEN?
Most would agree that the burden imposed by
new taxes should be distributed equitably. But
reasonable people can differ on what constitutes
“fairness.” To some, a fair tax is one that assesses
individuals or families according to the benefits
they receive from the resulting public spending.
Others believe that fairness is achieved by levy-
ing taxes according to the ability to pay. In the
United States, this usually implies that tax sys-
tems should be “progressive,” that is, the share
of income that an individual or family pays in
taxes should rise as income rises. However,
what degree of progressivity is “fair” is very con-
tentious. Some people believe fairness requires
proportionality; others contend that consump-
tion rather than income is a better measure of households’ abil-
ity to pay taxes. 
The Commission analyzed how each new state tax would af-
fect the tax burdens of New Hampshire residents by income
class. To highlight the different distributional effects of the tax
alternatives, the Commission assumed that local taxes were re-
duced by the amount of the state tax increase;
in other words, total tax revenues did not
change. The tax burden for each income class
was measured as total state and local taxes paid
by residents in that class divided by their total
money income. Money income includes not
only wages and salaries, dividends, interest,
pensions, and realized capital gains, but also
cash transfers from all levels of government, such as public wel-
fare, unemployment insurance payments, and Social Security.
In analyzing fairness, the Commission made somewhat dif-
ferent assumptions about tax incidence than it did in assessing
competitive implications. For the most part, the Commission
assumed no shifting; tax burdens fall on those incurring the
tax liability. Thus, the burden of sales taxes on consumer goods
and services is borne by households in proportion to the value
of their taxable purchases, and the burden of income taxes is
borne by households in proportion to their taxable income.
While data limitations contributed to this decision, it also re-
flected the mindset of Commission members. They understood
that taxes “stick where they hit” for a considerable period of
time. Tax burdens are shifted only after some taxpayers change
their behavior to reduce their exposure. These behavioral
changes, such as moving to another state, are often costly and
time consuming. Until they are completed, those initially liable
for a tax bear much of its burden. Commission members were
especially interested in analyzing how tax burdens are distrib-
uted before shifting occurs because other widely circulated
studies of the fairness of New Hampshire’s taxes have adopt-
ed this perspective. The Commission wanted a clear compari-
son between its findings and those of other evaluations.
An important exception to the general assumption of no shift-
ing pertained to property taxes on residential rental property.
The burden here was assumed to be borne by tenants in pro-
portion to their rent. Given New Hampshire’s tight housing
markets, it seemed reasonable to think that landlords would pass
on higher property taxes to their renters. 
As an indicator of fairness, the Commission computed the
ratio of the tax burden of the highest income class to that of the
lowest income class under each tax scenario. The higher the ra-
tio, the more progressive the tax system. The Commission
found the substitution of income taxes for a property tax would
generally make New Hampshire’s tax system more progressive,
while the substitution of taxes on consumption, such as various
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The Commission found no clear evidence
that any of the tax options would have 
a larger impact on competitiveness
ARE NEW HAMPSHIRE PROPERTY TAXES REGRESSIVE?
A comparison of the estimated average property tax 
burdens of low-income and upper-middle-income households 





Annual cash income $15,000 to $20,000 $65,000 to $70,000
Share of households in this  80% 10 to 15%
income category that rent 
Rent paid, as a share of income 40% 20%
Total property taxes paid by landlords, 10% 7%
as a share of gross rent collected
Total property taxes paid by households 4% 1.4%
in this category, as a share of income
HOMEOWNERS
Value of home  $50,000 to $80,000  $225,000 to $275,000
Share of households in this  20% 85 to 90%
income category that own
Property tax rate  $28.48 $28.48
(per $1,000 valuation)
Total property taxes paid $1,425 to $2,280 $6,400 to $7,800
Total property taxes paid by households 7.1 to 15.2% 9.2 to 12.4%
in this category, as a share of income
OWNERS AND RENTERS
Total property taxes paid, 4.6 to 6.2% 8.0 to 11.3%
as a share of income
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forms of sales taxation, would make the system less progressive.
The Commission concluded that the substitution of a state
property tax for local property taxes would not significantly
change the fairness of the state’s revenue system. 
Although the Commission found that the introduction of an
income tax would be most progressive, it also found — much
to the surprise of many in New Hampshire and contrary to the
conclusion of other studies — that the current tax system, heav-
ily dependent on the property tax, is also relatively progres-
sive. It is commonly believed that property taxes impose a high-
er burden on low-income households than on high-income
households. For homeowners, this perception is correct. Most
of the widely circulated studies focus their analysis on home-
owners, or on a segment of the population (such as the mar-
ried nonelderly) where the incidence of homeownership is un-
usually high. To some degree, this is understandable; 70 percent
of New Hampshire households own their own home. Howev-
er, the incidence of homeownership is distributed very unevenly
across income groups. Homeownership is much less common
among the poor than among the well-to-do, and including
renters in the analyses changes the results significantly.
According to conventional wisdom, the property tax burden
of low-income renters is high, at least as high as the burden
borne by low-income homeowners. It is usually assumed that
landlords shift much of their property tax burden to their ten-
ants in the form of higher rent. However, even if this is true —
and the Commission assumed it is — renters and homeown-
ers in a given income class may not face comparable tax bur-
dens. Indeed, the Commission found that, other things equal,
the renter is likely to bear the lower burden.
To appreciate how the Commission came to this conclusion,
consider the example in the table, “Are New Hampshire Prop-
erty Taxes Regressive?” Susan Almy, a New Hampshire state
representative initially skeptical of the Commission’s conclu-
sion, asked two landlords renting low-income units in her
hometown of Lebanon for their total property taxes and total
gross rental collections in 2000. In each case, the ratio of prop-
erty taxes to rent was about 10 percent. Suppose (1) that this
ratio is generally representative of low-income renters in
Lebanon; (2) that their rent is, on average, about 40 percent of
income; and (3) that landlords pass on all property taxes to ten-
ants in the form of higher rents. Then, the property tax burden
of the average low-income renter in Lebanon in 2000 would
be about 4 percent of income (that is, 10 percent x 40 percent).
What about Lebanon’s low-income homeowners? Real es-
tate listings suggest that the average house or condominium
owned by households with incomes between $15,000 and
$20,000 is worth between $50,000 and $80,000. The property
tax bill on such a property would be between $1,425 and $2,280.
Thus, the average property tax burden would be between 7 per-
cent and 15 percent of income. Since only about 20 percent of
Lebanon’s low-income households are homeowners, the aver-
age property tax burden of all low-income households, com-
bining both renters and owners, is between 4.5 percent and just
over 6 percent.
Compare these figures to similar calculations for households
earning $65,000 to $70,000 a year. Renters at this income lev-
el pay about 20 percent of income as rent, and the percentage
of rent covering property taxes is probably closer to 7 percent
than 10 percent, since more of their rent goes towards ameni-
ties such as better maintenance and security. Thus, their prop-
erty tax burden would be about 1.5 percent. In contrast, as the
table lays out, the property tax burden on homeowners in this
income class would be between 9 percent and 12.5 percent of
income. Since 85 percent to 90 percent of households in this in-
come category are homeowners, the average property tax
burden for upper-middle income households, both renters
and homeowners, is between 8 percent and 11 percent.
Critics of the Commission’s analysis point out that it
fails to evaluate the distributional impact of the property
tax among households with incomes above $70,000.
These account for about one-third of all New Hampshire
households. For this income group, New Hampshire’s
property tax is very likely regressive. However, much of the
concern about the regressivity of the property tax centers on
lower-income households; and here, as demonstrated, tax bur-
dens are not as heavy as commonly thought. 
POSTSCRIPT
After the Commission issued its final report, Governor Shaheen
recommended the imposition of a 2.5-percent sales tax dedi-
cated to school funding. The state legislature rejected her plan,
as well as an alternative broad-based tax on consumption and
a personal income tax. The legislature eventually opted to meet
its school funding requirement by retaining the statewide prop-
erty tax, raising business taxes and the telecommunications ser-
vice tax, and eliminating an exemption from the real estate
transfer tax.
The future remains uncertain, however, as the constitution-
ality of the state property tax might be successfully challenged.
In January 2001, a judge in Rockingham District Court ruled
that the tax violated the state constitution. In May, the state
Supreme Court, in a split decision, reversed that ruling but left
the door open for future challenges. Additionally, the commu-
nities that filed the original Claremont suit have declared their
intention to go back to court to challenge the manner in which
the state has determined the price tag of providing adequate
schooling for every educable child in the state.
As Daniel Webster knew, and the Commission found out, in
order to shed a little light, you have to generate a little heat. One
hopes that state policymakers have found more of the former
and less of the latter in the Commission’s report and, and that
they will find it a useful tool as they continue to deal with New
Hampshire’s school funding dilemma. S
The substitution of income for property
taxes would tend to make the system 
more progressive; a sales tax less so